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THE RICO "ENTERPRISE" ELEMENT: DOES IT
ENCOMPASS ASSOCIATIONS FORMED FOR
ILLEGITIMATE PURPOSES?
United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 4743 (U.S. June 17, 1981).
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act' was en-
acted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,2 a com-
prehensive package of legislation designed to "seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United States."' 3 RICO is a revolutionary stat-
ute which gives unprecedented powers to federal prosecutors. 4  One
commentator has called it "the most sweeping criminal statute ever
passed by Congress." 5
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as RICO].
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28
U.S.C.). Title IX is one of the twelve titles of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The
other titles are: Title I, Special Grand Jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334; Title II, General Immunity,
id. §§ 6001-6005; Title III, Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826; Title IV, False Declarations,
18 U.S.C. § 1623; Title V, Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses, Pub. L. No.
91-452 §§ 501-504, 84 Stat. 933 (1970) (not codified); Title VI, Depositions, 18 U.S.C. § 3503; Title
VII, Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, id. § 3504; Title VIII, Syndicated Gambling, id.
§§ 1511 and 1955; Title X, Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing, id. §§ 3575-3578; Title XI,
Regulation of Explosives, id. §§ 841-848; Title XII, National Commission on Individual Rights,
Pub. L. No. 91-452 §§ 1201-1211, 84 Stat. 960 (1970) (not codified).
3. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No.
91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
4. See Magarity, RICO Investigations: 4 Case Study, 17 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 367
(1980). In addition, the penalties for RICO violations are among the most severe criminal penal-
ties in the United States Code. The penalty section of RICO provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the
United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962,
and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, oper-
ated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
It has also been held that a defendant can be convicted and separately punished for both the
predicate crimes that form the basis of the RICO charge and for the RICO violation itself without
violating the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). The statute also authorizes broad civil
remedies modeled after the anti-trust laws. The civil remedies which may be imposed under
RICO include treble damages, divestiture of interests, and injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(1976). For a discussion of RICO's civil remedies see Note, Equitable Law Enforcement and the
Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970-United States v. Cappetto, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 508 (1976);
Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business. Civil Remediesfor "Criminal
Activity", 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1975).
5. Atkinson, "'Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S C §§ 1961-68."
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1978) [hereinafter
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A RICO violation occurs when any person6 invests income derived
from a "pattern of racketeering activity" in any interstate "enterprise";
7
when any person acquires or maintains an interest in any interstate
"enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering activity";8 when any
person employed by or associated with any interstate "enterprise" con-
ducts or participates in the affairs of that "enterprise" through a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity";9 or when any person conspires to violate
any of the above proscriptions.' 0
The statute designates twenty-five federal crimes and eight state
felonies as racketeering activities. " The commission of two or more
referred to as Atkinson]. Before RICO was enacted, the federal government's only avenue of
attack on organized crime was through traditional criminal statutes which focused on isolated
incidents of criminal activity. See Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront" RICO and Labor
Racketeering, 17 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 349 (1980); Note, The Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act." An Analysis ofthe Confusion in its Application and a Proposalfor Reform,
33 VAND. L. REV. 441, 442 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Vanderbilt]. Under such statutes it
was possible to imprison individual members of criminal organizations; however, it was virtually
impossible to damage seriously the criminal organization itself. Id. at 442. Even through the use
of traditional conspiracy theories, it was often impossible to prosecute successfully cases in which
apparently unrelated persons were associated in the commission of a diversified pattern of crimes.
See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 900-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
RICO changed that picture dramatically, and it has found increasing use among prosecutors in
recent years. See Atkinson, supra, at 3 n.21.
6. The statute defines "person" broadly as including "any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes
of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of
the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if
the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity of the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the
outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsec-
tion (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(i) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
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acts of such racketeering activity within a ten-year period constitutes a
"pattern of racketeering activity."' 2 The crucial RICO element, the
"enterprise" which must be affected by the "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity," is broadly defined in the statute as including "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." '
3
As prosecutors have sought to tap RICO's enormous potential as a
weapon against all types of organized criminal groups, they have re-
peatedly urged that the statutory definition of "enterprise"-specifi-
cally the phrase "any .. .group ...associated in fact"-is broad
enough to embrace associations formed for wholly illegitimate pur-
poses such as prostitution or gambling rings.14 Relying on a legislative
history which shows that Congress was concerned with the infiltration
of legitimate businesses by racketeers, defendants convicted of RICO
violations involving illegitimate enterprises have argued that such as-
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports
bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to
theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section
664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relat-
ing to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gam-
bling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire
fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruc-
tion of criminal investigations), section 15 11 (relating to the obstruction of State or local
law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or ex-
tortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate trans-
portation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund
payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sec-
tions 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections
2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to
white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code,
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) provides:
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one
of which occured after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior
act of racketeering activity.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) provides:
"enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.
14. See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1020 (1978) (prostitution ring); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (illegal gambling ring).
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sociations are outside RICO's scope.' 5 The question of whether RICO
is limited in its application to legitimate enterprises or whether it may
be applied to illegitimate enterprises as well has been the source of
much litigation and has caused a split in the United States courts of
appeals which have considered the issue.
The majority view, adopted either expressly or by implication in
eight circuits, is that an "enterprise" may be an association formed for
illegal purposes. 16 Some courts have even held that the same criminal
conduct which constitutes an illegitimate "enterprise" can also consti-
tute the "pattern of racketeering activity" through which a defendant
conducts that "enterprise's" affairs in violation of RICO.
17
The minority view, adopted by the Eighth Circuit,' 8 and recently
rejected in favor of the majority position by the Sixth Circuit,' 9 limits
the scope of RICO. The Eighth Circuit has held that the mere associa-
tion of two defendants to commit crimes constituting a "pattern of
racketeering activity" cannot constitute the "enterprise" which is af-
fected by that "pattern of racketeering activity." However, the Eighth
Circuit expressly stopped short of declaring that the affected "enter-
prise" must be legitimate.20 Instead, while it did not directly counte-
nance the view that a RICO "enterprise" may be illegitimate, the court
15. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980) ("Defendants argue that § 1962 is not applicable to an illegal enterprise [a home
invasion ring] but only to an infiltrated legitimate business.").
16. E.g., United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Provenzano,
620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 267 (1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d
523 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980);
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979);
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). There is no
reported case in which the Tenth Circuit has taken a position on the issue.
17. A particularly good example of this line of reasoning appears in United States v. Aleman,
609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). In that case the court upheld RICO
convictions based on an indictment which charged in relevant part:
[Bleing persons associated with an enterprise engaged in and the activities of which af-
fected interstate commerce, to wit, a group of individuals associated in fact to plan and
commit robberies, to carry away stolen goods and to divide among themselves the stolen
goods and all proceeds derived therefrom, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did con-
duct and participate, directly and indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern ofracketeering activity, to wit, the commission ofrobberies in Chicago,
Illinois, Oak Lawn, Illinois and Indianapolis, Indiana.
Id. at 302 (emphasis added). In short, the Government in this case was able to prove two of the
requisite elements of the offense merely by showing that the defendants had planned and commit-
ted three home invasions.
18. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
19. United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980) (After a rehearing en banc, the
court reversed an earlier panel decision, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), which had held that a RICO
"enterprise" must be "ostensibly" legitimate.).
20. 626 F.2d at 1372 ("[W]e do not rest our holding on the word 'legitimate' .
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required only that the "enterprise" have an existence distinct from the
crimes constituting the "pattern of racketeering activity."
2'
In United States v. Turkette,22 the First Circuit refused to accept an
expansive interpretation of "enterprise" and joined the Eighth Circuit
in giving the term a more limited scope. The First Circuit, however,
went a step further and explicitly held that a RICO "enterprise" must
be legitimate.
23
Noting the conflict which has developed among the circuits, a
judge in another recent case involving this issue stated: "The number
of RICO prosecutions is rising rapidly. There is a 'need for certainty in
the workaday world of conducting criminal trials.' The courts of ap-
peal have performed their assigned function, and the issue now awaits
authoritative resolution by the Supreme Court. ' 24 As if in response to
this call for action, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Turkette 25 to consider the question of whether a group of individuals
associated in fact to commit unlawful acts for profit can constitute an
"enterprise" within the meaning of RICO. 26
This case comment will examine RICO's legislative history and
trace the development of the conflicting interpretations of the "enter-
prise" element in the United States courts of appeals. The Turkette
decision will then be reviewed and an analysis of the court's reasoning
will be presented. Finally, it will be suggested that, while the majority
approach may be too broad, the limitation of RICO undertaken by the
First Circuit in Turkette is unnecessarily restrictive. It will be recom-
mended that the Supreme Court reverse the First Circuit's decision in
favor of the somewhat more liberal construction expounded by the
Eighth Circuit which requires only that the two crucial elements, the
"enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeering activity," be proven by
independent sets of facts.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RICO
Organized criminal activity has been recognized as a serious prob-
2 1. Id. ("[Tihe phrase 'a group of individuals associated in fact .. ,' as used in [the] defini-
tion of the term 'enterprise' . . . [encompasses] only an association . . that has an existence that
can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racke-
teering activity.' ").
22. 632 F.2d 896 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 938 (1981) (No. 80-808).
23. 1d. at 899.
24. United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1055 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted).
25. United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 938 (1981) (No. 80-808).
26. 49 U.S.L.W. 3517 (1981).
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lem in American society for over half a century. 27 Congress turned its
attention to the problem in 1950 when the Special Senate Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, chaired by Ten-
nessee Senator Estes Kefauver, conducted a yearlong series of hearings
across the country which uncovered widespread patterns of organized
criminal activity in almost every major city in the nation. 28 Despite
these revelations, the findings of the Kefauver Committee produced lit-
tle in the way of legislation aimed at combatting organized criminal
groups.
29
Additional evidence of the alarming nature and scope of organized
crime appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 30 Hampered by cor-
27. In 1931, The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, which became
known as the Wickersham Commission, gave one of the first reports detailing the prohibition-era
evolution of small criminal gangs into underworld cartels which conducted their illegitimate oper-
ations as highly organized and efficient businesses. The Wickersham Commission recommended
an immediate nationwide investigation into the phenomenon of criminals operating in a business-
like manner. The recommendation was not followed, however, and the Commission's desire for
the development of a plan for the control of organized crime went unrealized. During the next
twenty years, the nation's attention was focused on the problems of the Great Depression and
World War II. Almost totally unhindered by law enforcement, organized criminal syndicates
prospered. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 15-16 (1976) [hereinafter referred to
as NATIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
Decades later, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice emphasized the similarity between the operations of organized crime and those of legitimate
businesses when it observed that:
[organized crime] involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex
as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of
legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive, but rather the result of intricate
conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields
of activity in order to amass huge profits.
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 1 (1967). See generally D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE
NATION (1969); R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, THE CRIME CONFEDERATION (1969).
28. In addition to finding criminal empires founded on illegal gambling, drug trafficking,
loan-sharking and other crimes, the Kefauver Committee discovered that these criminal enter-
prises facilitated their operations through a nationwide pattern of bribery and protection pay-
ments to law enforcement officials as well as extensive payoffs to corrupt politicians. See A.
BEQUAI, ORGANIZED CRIME 43 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as ORGANIZED CRIME].
29. See United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir 1980); ORGANIZED CRIME,
siupra note 28, at 44; 115 CONG REC. 5876 (1969) (statement of Senator McClellan).
30. In 1957, the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Manage-
ment Field, chaired by Senator John McClellan, uncovered extensive involvement of organized
crime figures in legitimate labor and business organizations. 115 CONG REC. 5876 (1969) (state-
ment of Senator McClellan). In the autumn of 1957, police in upstate New York discovered the
infamous Apalachin conference at which more than 70 crime syndicate chieftans from across the
nation had converged. ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 28, at 46; NATIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 27, at 16. In 1963, Joseph Valachi, a long time member of organized crime who had
become a government informer, shocked the nation with his televised testimony before the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Valachi described the structure and methods of a
nationwide network of criminal "families" known to its members as La Cosa Nostra. Organized
Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm on Investigations
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ruption and lack of resources, state and local governments took no sig-
nificant action. On the federal level, both Congress and the Justice
Department took steps to deal with the problem;3' however, these
measures proved largely ineffective, and organized crime continued to
flourish.
32
In 1969, Senator John McClellan introduced the first comprehen-
sive package of legislation designed specifically to attack organized
crime. 33 After amendments and revisions, 34 this bill emerged as the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The overriding purpose of this
Act was to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering pro-
cess, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime.
' 35
ofthe Sen. Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-83 (1963) (testimony of
Joseph Valachi).
31. In 1961, Congress passed several pieces of legislation as part of a program to combat
organized crime. This legislation included 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976) (prohibiting the promotion of
gambling, narcotics, and other criminal enterprises through interstate travel or the use of interstate
facilities); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1073 (flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony), 1084 (transmission
of wagering information), 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia) (1976); and
15 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1964) (transportation of firearms), repealedby Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 234. In addition, Attorney General Robert Kennedy expanded the
work of the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section and increased the
number of personnel assigned to that unit. 116 CONG. REC. 844-45 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Kennedy).
32. See Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts.- An Ana4ysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 837, 839 n.13 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Bradley].
33. This legislation was introduced by Senator McClellan on January 15, 1969 with Senators
Hruska, Allen, and Ervin as cosponsors and was known as the Organized Crime Control Act of
1969. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 827 (1969). As originally proposed, this Act did
not contain a provision comparable to RICO.
34. On March 20, 1969, Senator Hruska introduced the Criminal Activities Profits Act. S.
1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6925 (1969). This Act prohibited the investment of
illegally gained income in "any business enterprise" affecting interstate commerce. On April 18,
1969 Senators Hruska and McClellan introduced the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969. S. 1861,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9512 (1969). This bill served as a replacement for S. 1623
and referred to the infiltration of "legitimate organizations." A companion bill to S. 1861 was
introduced in the House by Representative Poff on April 21, 1969. H.R. 10312, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9753 (1969). S. 1861 was subsequently incorporated as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The House Committee on the Judiciary then added the
last two titles to the bill before it was enacted. These were Title XI, "Regulation of Explosives,"
and Title XII, "National Commission on Individual Rights." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 
9 1st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4007.
35. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Finding and Purpose, Pub. L. No.
91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). Summarizing the scope of the problems to which the Act was
addressed, Congress found that:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and wide-
spread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by un-
lawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime
derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeav-
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As one of the twelve titles of the Act, RICO was part of this all-out
assault on organized criminal activity. In its report on the Act, the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee stated that Title IX (RICO) "has as its pur-
pose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate com-
merce."'36 Similarly, the report of the House Judiciary Committee
stated that "[slection 1962 [of RICO] establishes a threefold prohibition
aimed at stopping the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate organiza-
tions."
37
The legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act con-
tains many other references to RICO which show that Congress was
concerned with the infiltration of legitimate businesses by criminal ele-
ments. For example, during his presentation of the bill to the Senate,
Senator McClellan summarized the first ten titles and indicated that
RICO had been drafted "to attack and to mitigate the effects of racket-
eer infiltration of legitimate organizations affecting interstate com-
merce."' 38 During the initial Senate debates on the Act, Senator Hruska
of Nebraska, a cosponsor of a bill that had been one of the forerunners
of RICO, commented that "[i]n recent years, organized crime has be-
come increasingly diversified and has become entrenched in legitimate
businesses and in labor unions where it employs terrorism, extortion,
ors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the impor-
tation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, inter-
fere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten
the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens;
and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence neces-
sary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to
the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
Id.
36. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT
oiF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
37. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT
OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4007, 4033.
38. 116 CONG. REC. 585 (1970). Senator McClellan reiterated this view when he testified in
the House hearings on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 that RICO was "designed to
prevent organized criminals from infiltrating legitimate commercial organizations with the pro-
ceeds of their criminal activities or with violent and corrupt methods of operation, and to remove
them and their influence from such enterprises once they have been infiltrated." Organized Crime
Control- Hearings on S 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) (statement of Senator John L. McClellan) [hereinaf-
ter referred to as House Hearings].
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tax evasion, bankruptcy fraud and manipulation, and other measures
to drive out lawful owners and officials."
39
Like remarks were made during the House debates. Representa-
tive Poff, the floor manager for the bill stated:
[Plerhaps the single most alarming aspect of the organized crime
problem in the United States in recent years has been the growing
infestation of racketeers into legitimate business enterprises ....
Title IX of S. 30 provides the machinery whereby the infiltration of
racketeers into legitimate businesses can be stopped and the process
reversed when such infiltration does occur. . . .The provisions of
the Title operate largely against racketeering activity as defined in
the bill or, more precisely, against patterns of racketeering activity.
40
The Justice Department echoed these concerns when it summa-
rized RICO for a House subcommittee conducting hearings on Senator
McClellan's bill: "Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of le-
gitimate business by organized crime, and . . to reach the criminal
syndicates' major sources of revenue . . . . The proposal appears to
cover most of the methods through which La Cosa Nostra customarily
infiltrates and operates legitimate business enterprises."
'4'
Despite this central concern with the infitration of legitimate busi-
nesses by organized crime, there were two instances when members of
Congress indicated that RICO could have a broader application. In a
discussion with Senators McClellan and Hruska concerning the possi-
bility that RICO might inject the Judiciary Committee into areas tradi-
tionally under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Commerce,
Senator Magnuson asked, "Also, I suppose the proceeds from illegal
activities in one State that are transported to another State to be used in
further illegal activities would be included [within the scope of
RICO]?"' 42 To this Senator Hruska replied, "They might be involved
in [RICO]. I agree with the comments of [Senator McClellan] [regard-
ing the use of RICO to block the investment of illegally obtained funds
39. 116 CONG. REC. 601 (1970). Several other Senators made comparable remarks. See id.
at 603 (remarks of Senator Yarborough); id. at 607 (remarks of Senator Byrd); id. at 953 (remarks
of Senator Thurmond).
40. 116 CONG. REC. 35295 (1970). Similarly, Representative St. Germain observed that:
[tihe danger of organized crime arises because the vast profits acquired from the sale of
illicit goods and services are being invested in licit enterprises, in both the economic
sphere and the political sphere. It is when criminal syndicates start to undermine basic
economic and political traditions and institutions that the real trouble begins. And the
real trouble has begun in the United States.
Id. at 35199. Other congressmen voiced similar concerns. See id. at 35196 (remarks of Rep.
Celler); id. at 35201 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch); id. at 35206 (remarks of Rep. Kleppe); id. at
35304 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id. at 35319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson).
41. House Hearings, supra note 38, at 170 (Department of Justice comments on S. 30).
42. 116 CONG. REC. 844 (1970).
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in legitimate businesses]. ' 43 Later, in describing the provisions of the
Act on the floor of the House, Representative Meskill summarized
RICO by stating that it "[made] it a crime to engage in a pattern of
racketeering activity.""
These comments by Senator Magnuson and Representative Mes-
kill do not alter the conclusion that Congress' primary concern in en-
acting RICO was to prevent racketeers from taking over legitimate
businesses. However, the comments do tend to discount the notion that
Congress never considered the possibility that RICO could be used to
strike a more direct blow at racketeering activity. It seems particularly
significant that neither Senator McClellan nor Senator Hruska, the
principal architects of RICO, gave any indication that Senator
Magnuson had gone too far during their discussion in suggesting that
RICO could reach the investment of illegally obtained funds from one
state in further illegal activity in another state.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF RICO TO
WHOLLY ILLEGITIMATE "ENTERPRISES"
RICO was seldom used during the first five years after its enact-
ment. 45 This initial lack of use has been attributed, at least in part, to
the unfamiliarity of prosecutors with the potential of the new statute.
46
Since 1975, however, the number of reported court decisions involving
RICO has risen sharply, and prosecutors have used this new tool with
devastating effectiveness against a wide variety of interstate criminal
combines.
Predictably, RICO defendants caught in the statute's broad net
have sought to escape by arguing that the law was never meant to apply
to them. One argument unsuccessfully advanced by members of small
criminal gangs has been that Congress was concerned only with vast
criminal syndicates such as the Mafia when it enacted the Organized
Crime Control Act and that RICO was therefore inapplicable to orga-
nized criminals who were not part of such traditional "organized
crime" cartels.47 Another frequently used argument has been that the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 35328.
45. See Vanderbilt, supra note 5, at 443-44 n.12.
46. See Atkinson, supra note 5, at 3 n.21.
47. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980), in which the court quoted from a law review article written by Senator John L. Mc-
Clellan, one of the sponsors of the Organized Crime Control Act: McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act (S 30) Or Its Critics- Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141-
44 (1970), and concluded from the Senator's discussion of the futility of attempting to exclude
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term "enterprise" as used in RICO was intended by Congress to apply
only to legitimate businesses which were taken over by racketeers and
therefore could not be used to reach criminals who conducted the oper-
ations of illegal businesses through racketeering. 48 Until quite recently,
however, efforts by defendants to persuade the United States courts of
appeals that RICO cannot encompass a "business" that remains totally
illegitimate have been unavailing.
The Majority View of a RICO "Enterprise": It May Be Illegitimate
Among the United States courts of appeals which have been called
upon to determine the scope of RICO's "enterprise" element, the ma-
jority have opted for a construction that permits the Government to
prove that element by evidence of exclusively criminal conduct. The
first of the circuits to adopt this position was the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cappetto.49 Cap-
petto involved a group of individuals who had associated for the sole
purpose of illegally receiving and transmitting horse race and sports
wagers. The Government sought to invoke civil remedies against this
illegal enterprise under section 1964 of RICO.50 The defendants ar-
gued that the gambling business in which they were engaged was illegal
and was, therefore, outside the scope of RICO, because Congress' pur-
pose in enacting RICO was to protect "legitimate business" against in-
filtration by racketeers.
The court found no merit in this argument and stated that "[bloth
the statutory language and the legislative history" supported an inter-
pretation of RICO's "enterprise" element that embraced illegal as well
crimes committed by persons not involved in organized crime from RICO's list of racketeering
offenses that Congress had fully contemplated that RICO could be applied to organized criminals
who were not members of "organized crime." See also United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352,
363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976), in which the court observed that although
Congress focused on some of the activities by which individuals and associations engaged in orga-
nized crime maintained their incomes or influence, RICO's prohibitions applied no matter who
engaged in those activities.
48. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975) ("Defendants contend that the Act does not authorize the action brought by the gov-
ernment here, because Congress' purpose was to protect 'legitimate business' against infiltration
by racketeers and not to prohibit racketeering itself.").
49. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
50. Specifically, the Government sought preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining
the defendants and those acting in concert with them from engaging in the illegal gambling busi-
ness which was the alleged "enterprise" in the case. In addition, the Government sought to divest
one of the defendants of his interest in the building where the "enterprise" operated. The Govern-
ment also sought to have the defendants disclose the names of their accomplices in the operation
and to have the defendants submit quarterly reports to the United States Attorney for a period of
ten years listing their current addresses, sources of income, and other information bearing on their
compliance with the injunction the court had been asked to enter. Id. at 1355.
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as legal enterprises.5 In support of its position that the term "enter-
prise" should be given this broad construction, the court cited a Second
Circuit case, United States v. Parness,5 2 in which foreign corporations
had been found to be RICO "enterprises." The Cappetto court viewed
this interpretation by the Second Circuit as evidence that Congress had
intended to give the term "enterprise" a very broad meaning.5 3 The
Cappetto court also pointed out that "[tihere is nothing in the language
of subsection (b) or (c) [of section 1962 of RICO] or in the definition
section of the Act, Section 1961, to suggest that the enterprise must be a
legitimate one." 54 The court acknowledged that one of Congress'
targets in enacting RICO had been the infiltration of legitimate organi-
zations by organized crime, but the court declared that the prohibitions
of subsections 1962(b) and (c) demonstrated a congressional intent to
prohibit any pattern of racketeering activity in or affecting commerce.
55
51. 502 F.2d at 1358.
52. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). In Parness, the defend-
ants were charged with interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1970), and with violating RICO by using a "pattern of racketeering activity" consisting of that
transportation of stolen property to acquire an interest in an "enterprise." The "enterprise" in-
volved was a hotel located in a foreign country. The defendants argued that RICO was applicable
only to domestic "enterprises" and that such a foreign corporation could not constitute a RICO
"enterprise." The Second Circuit rejected that argument, stating:
"Enterprise" is defined in § 1961(4) to include "any ... corporation." On its face the
proscription is all inclusive. It permits no inference that the Act was intended to have a
parochial application. The legislative history, moreover, strongly indicated the intent of
Congress that this provision be broadly construed.
Id. at 439.
53. 502 F.2d at 1358. The court also relied on a section of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
report on the Organized Crime Control Act as further evidence that Congress intended to include
an illegal gambling business such as that involved in the Cappetto case within the meaning of the
term "enterprise." The section of the report quoted by the court read:
Despite the best efforts made to date by both the Federal and the several State govern-
ments, gambling continues to exist on a large scale to the benefit of organized crime and
the detriment of the American people. A more effective effort must be mounted to elimi-
nate illegal gambling. In that effort the Federal Government must be able not only to
deny the use and facilities of interstate commerce to the day-to-day operations of illegal
gamblers-as it can do under existing statutes-but also to prohibit directly substantial
business enterprises of gambling ...
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1969)). The court failed to point out,
however, that the quoted language does not pertain to RICO but to the federal gambling statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1955, which was enacted as Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act. Commen-
tators have been justifiably critical of the court's misleading use of this language from the Senate
report. See Bradley, supra note 32, at 852-53; Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970. An Analysis ofIssues Arising in Its Interpretation, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 89, 97 (1977).
54. 502 F.2d at 1358.
55. Id. Five years later, in United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980), the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the position it had established in Cap-
petto regarding the broad scope of the RICO "enterprise" element. In Aleman, the court was
faced with a RICO case in which the alleged "enterprise" was an interstate home invasion ring.
The "business" of the defendants consisted of periodically forcing their way into the homes of
wealthy residents of Illinois and Indiana. Once inside, the defendants threatened the residents at
gunpoint, occasionally pistol whipped them, then tied them up and proceeded to loot their homes
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A similar conclusion was reached by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Altese.56 InAltese, the court noted that the language of RICO
was clear, precise and unambiguous. The court found that the repeated
use of the explicit word "any" throughout the statute, particularly in
the statute's references to "enterprise," made it clear that Congress had
not intended to eliminate illegitimate businesses from the scope of
RICO.57 In addition, the Altese court observed that Congress could
have inserted a single word of restriction if it had intended a different
result, but had not done so. The court further stated that the same
result would follow even if the statutory language was not found to be
so explicit on its face and it was obliged to construe that language. The
court declared that to read RICO as including legitimate businesses
while excluding illegitimate businesses "does not make sense since it
leaves a loophole for illegitimate business to escape its coverage.
'58
The Second Circuit therefore held that an illegal gambling business
constituted an "enterprise" to which RICO applied.
59
of valuables. The defendants contended that their convictions under RICO could not stand be-
cause RICO was applicable only to legitimate businesses infiltrated by racketeers and not to an
illegal enterprise. Citing its prior decision in Cappeuo, the court reiterated its conclusion that
Congress had not only intended to protect legitimate business through RICO, but had also in-
tended the statute to cover other patterns of racketeering activities in or affecting commerce. Hav-
ing concluded that RICO did indeed embrace illegal enterprises, the court relied on the Fifth
Circuit's holding in United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978), to decide that the home invasion ring involved in Aleman was a form of small business,
albeit a criminal business, which could be prosecuted as a RICO enterprise.
56. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
57. Id. at 106.
58. Id. at 106-07.
59. Id. at 107. Unlike the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Third Circuit has not expressly
adopted the broad interpretation of RICO's "enterprise" element as including associations formed
for the sole purpose of conducting illegal racketeering activities. However, the First Circuit
pointed out in United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 904 n.31 (lst Cir. 1980), that the Third
Circuit has recently rendered a table affirmance of a conviction under RICO for engaging in a
wholly unlawful enterprise, United States v. Manchester, 605 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (table), cer.
denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). And, in a series of cases calling for decisions on the scope of RICO in
slightly different contexts, the Third Circuit has made it clear that it leans toward acceptance of an
expansive interpretation of RICO's provisions.
For example, in United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977), a bail bond agency
was alleged to have committed extensive bribery of court officials. In a prosecution under RICO,
it was alleged that the bail bond agency was an "enterprise" and that various magistrates and
constables employed by the courts had been "associated" with that enterprise in such a manner as
to violate § 1962(c) of RICO. The district court had dismissed the RICO indictments against the
court employees on the ground that the independent status of those employees in relation to the
"enterprise" precluded a finding of a prosecutable "association" between them and the enterprise.
In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit stressed the specific congressional directive that
the provisions of RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at
1135-36 (citing The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947 (1970)).
In another case, United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978), the Third Circuit held that a public agency, in that case the Pennsylvania De-
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The Fifth Circuit has developed a line of cases in which it consist-
ently has held that illegal enterprises fall within the scope of RICO.
60
In United States v. Elliott,61 the Fifth Circuit carried the broad interpre-
partment of Revenue's Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes, was an "enterprise" within the
scope of RICO. The defendants argued that in construing the statutory definition of "enterprise,"
the phrase "other legal entity" following the nouns of narrow scope relating to different forms of
business ventures could not be extended to encompass state governmental bodies. This argument
was grounded on the doctrine of eusdem generis, a maxim of statutory construction which says
that general terms following a listing of specific items in a statute must be read to include only
items in the same general class as the specific items. The court flatly rejected the defendants'
argument and pointed out that ejusdem generis is not a rule of law but merely a useful tool of
construction that should not be employed when the intention of the legislature is otherwise appar-
ent. The court then stated that it was clear that Congress had intended the words defining an
"enterprise" to go beyond private business or labor organizations. In this connection, the court
said:
As we read the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress was not so much concerned with
limiting the protective and remedial features of the Act to business and labor organiza-
tions as it was with reducing the insidious capabilities of persons in organized crime to
infiltrate the American economy. . . . In other words, Congress' concern was enlarging
the number of tools with which to attack the invasion of the economic life of the country
by the cancerous influences of racketeering activity; Congress did not confine its scrutiny
to special areas of economic activity. Congress had no reason to adopt a constricted
approach to the solution of the problem.
Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted).
Finally, in the 1980 case of United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 267 (1980), the Third Circuit held that a group of individuals associated for the sole
purpose of carrying out a complex labor kickback scheme constituted an "enterprise" within the
framework of RICO. The defendants predictably argued that their association was not a RICO
"enterprise" because it had no legitimate purpose. Citing its prior holding in Forsythe that the
provisions of RICO were to be liberally construed and noting that, at that time, five other circuits
had rejected arguments such as the defendants', the Third Circuit stated: "We decline in this case
to construe the RICO statute so as to allow the appellants a defense that they made sure not to
engage in any legal activity." Id. at 993 (emphasis in original).
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit indicated its support for a broad interpretation of
RICO's "enterprise" element in United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979). In that case, the court found that a legitimate restaurant that was
loosely connected with the illegal trafficking of cocaine was a RICO "enterprise." In reaching that
conclusion, the court stated that the definition of "enterprise" in the statute included both the
legitimate and illegitimate aspects of the restaurant. As support, the court cited Congress' provi-
sion that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." The court also
referred to United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819
(1976), in which it had been held that Congress intended RICO to apply to all of the many forms
an enterprise can take. In addition, the court relied on the Second Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). The Swiderski
court noted that Altese had emphasized the applicability of RICO to "any" enterprise and reiter-
ated the observation of Altese that RICO contained no limiting language. 593 F.2d at 1249.
60. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980)
("enterprise" formed to commit "contract" murders, armed robberies, narcotics trafficking, and to
deal in counterfeit U.S. currency and Treasury bills); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th
Cir. 1978), ceri. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 444 U.S. 846 (1979) ("enterprise" consisted of an illegal
scheme to obtain money, marijuana, and cocaine); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) ("enterprise" consisted of a multi-state prostitution
ring); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) ("enterprise" was a group of individu-
als associated for the purpose of conducting rigged card games); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d
472 (5th Cir. 1976) ("enterprise" was an illegal gambling business conducted in conjunction with a
legitimate jukebox business).
61. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
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tation of RICO's "enterprise" element to its outermost limits. In Elli-
ott, a loosely knit group of individuals were associated not for the
purpose of conducting a single ongoing criminal enterprise such as a
prostitution ring, but instead engaged in a series of more than twenty
different criminal endeavors which included murder, theft and illegal
drug sales committed over a period of six years. The court stated that
Congress had made it clear in defining "enterprise" that RICO "ex-
tended beyond conventional business organizations to reach 'any . . .
group of individuals' whose association, however loose or informal,
furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate
crimes."'62 The court found that there was "no distinction, for 'enter-
prise' purposes, between a duly formed corporation that elects officers
and holds annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-structure that
controls a secret criminal network. ' 63 The court analogized the group
of criminals in Elliott to a large business conglomerate with a chairman
of the board overseeing the operation of many separate corporate de-
partments and concluded that the thread tying all of the criminal de-
partments and individuals together into an "enterprise" was the "desire
to make money."' 64 The court stated that while earlier cases had con-
sidered only enterprises engaged in one type of prohibited activity, a
single enterprise engaged in diversified activities "fits comfortably
within the proscriptions of the statute and the dictates of common
sense."
65
The Ninth Circuit has also held that the "enterprise" element of
RICO may be interpreted so as to include illegitimate businesses. In
United States v. Rone, 66 the court rejected the defendants' argument
that an "enterprise" must be a legitimate business in order to bring it
under the umbrella of RICO. Instead, the court adopted an analysis
similar to that applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Altese
67
and relied on the repeated use of the word "any" throughout the statute
and the absence of any words of restriction to find that "any enterprise
which is conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity falls
within the statute."
68
As in Altese, the Rone court found that the statutory language of
RICO was so clear on its face as to make unnecessary an examination
62. Id. at 898.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 899.
66. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
67. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
68. 598 F.2d at 568.
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of the legislative history. Nevertheless, the court did examine the legis-
lative history and found nothing there which contradicted its holding.
The court recognized that, according to RICO's legislative history, a
significant purpose of the legislation was to address the problems of the
infiltration of legitimate business by persons connected with organized
crime; however, the court stated that the recognition of this particular
purpose hardly led to the conclusion that RICO applied only to the
infiltration of legitimate businesses. 69 Instead, the court reasoned that
by permitting RICO to be invoked against illicit enterprises, the effect
was to retard the infiltration of legitimate businesses by denying racke-
teers the source of their investment funds. The court concluded that
"[t]he prophylactic aims of [RICO] are well served by such an applica-
tion of the statute."
70
In the 1980 case of United States v. Whitehead,71 the Fourth Cir-
cuit joined the majority in holding that a RICO "enterprise" encom-
passed any enterprise affecting interstate commerce, regardless of
whether that enterprise is lawful or unlawful. The "enterprise" in-
volved in Whitehead was an unlawful interstate prostitution ring cen-
tered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia. The county prosecutor had
succeeded in making substantial inroads on prostitution activity in the
county during his first term in office. The prosecutor then reversed his
allegiance, offering protection from prosecution in return for cash pay-
ments from the operators of the ring and free sexual services from pros-
titutes employed by the ring.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the RICO convictions of the county
prosecutor and the operators of the prostitution ring.72 In doing so, the
court stated that while it is clear that the infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses by organized crime was a primary concern of Congress in enact-
ing RICO, the statute itself is not so limited, and its prohibitions apply
to the use of racketeering activities to promote any enterprise affecting
interstate commerce.
73
The Sixth Circuit is the most recent court to adopt the majority
view of RICO's "enterprise" element. In United States v. Sutton,74 an
en banc court reheard a case involving a wholly illegitimate "enter-
prise" and reversed an earlier panel decision which had held that a
69. Id. at 569.
70. Id.
71. 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 525.
73. Id. n.1.
74. 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'g 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
RICO "enterprise" must be at least "ostensibly" legitimate. 75 The "en-
terprise" involved in Sutton was a large scale heroin distribution opera-
tion supported by ancillary illegal activities of trafficking in stolen
jewelry, household goods and guns.
The major premise of the court's analysis was that RICO's lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous, making it inappropriate to resort to
interpretation by means of legislative history or rules of statutory con-
struction. Noting that the dictionary definitions of "enterprise" are neu-
tral on the question of whether a particular enterprise is lawful or
unlawful, the court observed that Congress had realized the critical im-
portance of the term "enterprise" in RICO and had included a supple-
mentary statutory definition. The court commented that Congress
obviously would have known how to characterize an illegal or a legal
enterprise had it seen fit to do so. Therefore, according to the court,
Congress' choice of the single word "enterprise" and its use of that
word in the definition and throughout the statute without any modifiers
except the word "any" in sections 1962(b) and (c) was of major impor-
tance. Moreover, the court said, this use of the term "any" before "en-
terprise" made it clear that "enterprise" was used in an all-
encompassing sense, including both legal and illegal enterprises.
76
The court further observed that Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 had been entitled by Congress "Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations." By these terms, said the court,
Congress had included both ostensibly legitimate businesses availed of
for criminal purposes and wholly corrupt organizations such as the nar-
cotics distribution organization operated by the defendants.
According to the court, the interpretation urged by the defendants,
that the "enterprise" must be "ostensibly legitimate," would force the
prosecution to prove a negative: that an organized crime operation is
not totally illegal. The court found no reason for such a strained con-
struction and declared, "[W]e decline the appellant's invitation to
emasculate Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
' '77
75. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979).
76. 642 F.2d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 1004. Summarizing its review of the pertinent statutory language, the court stated:
[W]e point out that an interpretation of the statute which would restrict the use of the
term "enterprise" to "ostensibly legitimate" enterprises would commit the following er-
rors of construction. First, it would read out of the statute the statute's own definition of
"enterprise" which includes "group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.' Second, it would read out of the statute the meaning of the words "any enter-
prise," as used in the statute. And third, it would read into the statute without any
justification therefor the vague phrase "ostensibly legitimate" as a modifier for the word
"enterprise" which Congress had seen fit to employ alone.
Id. at 1008.
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The Minority View. A RICO "Enterprise" May Not Be an Association
Formed/or Illegitimate Purposes
In the 1979 case of United States v. Sutton,78 the Sixth Circuit be-
came the first of the United States courts of appeals to reject the major-
ity view and adopt a narrow interpretation of "enterprise," excluding
illegitimate associations from the scope of RICO. In a divided panel
opinion the court concluded, somewhat reluctantly, 79 that RICO could
be applied only to legitimate enterprises. After a rehearing en banc, the
Sixth Circuit reversed the panel's decision and adopted the majority
position. 80 Nevertheless, the panel's opinion provides useful insights
into the minority's approach to the issue.
In reaching its conclusion, the Sutton panel stated that the major-
ity view effectively read the "enterprise" element out of RICO. 8' This
was the result, the panel reasoned, of an excessive reliance on a literal
interpretation of the statute, which permitted the "enterprise" to be de-
fined in terms of the "pattern of racketeering activity." The court stated
that this application of the statute transformed RICO into a simple pro-
scription against "patterns of racketeering activity," a result which
Congress clearly had not intended. In order to avoid this result, Sutton
stated that the "enterprise" element must denote an entity larger than
and conceptually distinct from the "pattern of racketeering activity"
through which the affairs of the "enterprise" were conducted.
82
Thus, the Sutton panel reasoned, a "criminal enterprise" must in-
volve something more than simply a group involved in a pattern of
racketeering activity. However, the court was unable to find any rea-
sonably definite standard which would alert a potential offender that he
was about to cross the line dividing a mere "pattern of racketeering
activity" from a "criminal enterprise" within the ambit of RICO. Ab-
sent such a standard, the court felt constrained by the legislative his-
tory's numerous references to the elimination of the infiltration of
legitimate businesses by racketeers to adopt a construction which lim-
78. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
79. The Sutton court stated:
To say the least, the [defendants' argument that RICO does not reach a group of individ-
uals like themselves, who 'merely' have committed a series of racketeering acts] lacks
surface appeal, for it asks us to embrace the rather ironic proposition that racketeers
should be immune from criminal liability under [RICO] so long as they keep their activi-
ties wholly illegitimate.
Id. at 264 (emphasis in original).
80. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
81. 605 F.2d at 265.
82. Id. at 266.
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ited the scope of the term "enterprise" to associations that were at least
"ostensibly" legitimate.83 The court found that this construction not
only ensured that the "enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" elements of the offense retained an independent meaning, but
that it comported with the apparent intent of Congress in enacting the
statute. The Sutton panel, therefore, found that RICO had been inap-
propriately applied in a case where the alleged "enterprise" was a large
scale heroin distribution and stolen property fencing operation, the af-
fairs of which the defendants had conducted through a "pattern" of
heroin sales and fencing operations.
Approximately one year after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Sut-
ton, the Eighth Circuit adopted a somewhat similar position in United
States v. Anderson,84 Anderson involved the RICO convictions of two
Arkansas county administrators who had defrauded their counties of
substantial sums of money through their participation in a kickback
scheme with a supplier of county road equipment. 85 The only "enter-
prise" alleged by the Government was the same kickback scheme
which constituted the "pattern of racketeering activity" in the case.
86
The Eighth Circuit began by rejecting the Government's argument
that the reference to "any" enterprise in section 1962 mandated a broad
interpretation of "enterprise." The court stated that the word "any"
applied only after an "enterprise" first fit within the definition of that
term under subsection 1961(4).87 After finding that the wording and
composition of RICO, as well as the Act's legislative history and moti-
vating policies, supported the application of rules of statutory construc-
tion, the court applied the rule of eusdem generi 88 to the definition of
83. The court stated its formulation of the definition of "enterprise" as follows: "We there-
fore hold that an 'enterprise' within the meaning of the statute is 'any individual, partnership,
corporation, association . . . and any union or group of individuals associated in fact,' that is
organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose, either formally declared or informally
recognized." Id. at 270.
84. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
85. They carried the titles of "county judges"; however, their duties consisted of financial
administration, and they were not judicial officers. Id. at 1361.
86. Id. at 1362. In addition to the RICO counts, other counts in the indictment charged
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1952 (1976) by interstate travel in aid of the unlawful activity of
public servant bribery in violation of Arkansas law and violations of the federal mail fraud stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
87. 626 F.2d at 1366.
88. In the construction of statutes, wills, and other instruments, the eusdem generis rule pro-
vides that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particu-
lar and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are
to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifi-
cally mentioned. However, the rule does not necessarily require that the general provision be
limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named. Nor does it apply when the context
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"enterprise." Under that rule of statutory construction, the court con-
cluded that the meaning of the general phrase "any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity" was con-
trolled by the preceding specifically enumerated examples of legal enti-
ties, "individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity."
The court also looked to the definition of the other crucial RICO
element, the "pattern of racketeering activity," as an aid in construing
the term "enterprise." The court noted that the offenses selected by
Congress as racketeering activities, the predicate acts to a RICO of-
fense, reflected an economic orientation, reinforcing the view that Con-
gress intended RICO to interdict organized crime's infiltration of the
economy. The court found further support for this view in a law re-
view article written by Senator John McClellan, a cosponsor of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, in which he explained that the
purpose of RICO was served by selecting as racketeering activities
crimes which were well-suited for use to infiltrate legitimate organiza-
tions.89 In addition, citing another law review article which had ana-
lyzed the civil remedies authorized by RICO, the court pointed to those
civil remedies as evidence that RICO was designed to maintain the in-
tegrity of business enterprises supplying lawful public needs.90 The
court also examined the legislative history of RICO and concluded that
"[iut is beyond cavil that the primary purpose of section 1962 [of RICO]
was to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate busi-
ness enterprises." 9 1
From its analysis of the interrelationship between the "pattern of
racketeering activity" element and the "enterprise" element, the court
concluded that an overly broad construction of the "enterprise" ele-
ment could render that element of the offense interchangeable with the
"pattern of racketeering" element. Where, as in Anderson, the term
"enterprise" was defined so broadly as to permit proof of the "enter-
prise" element solely by evidence indicating an association to commit
the "pattern of racketeering activity," the court felt that the "enter-
prise" element was effectively eliminated from the statute. The court
stated that such an interpretation was contrary to legislative intent. In
manifests a contrary intention. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979). See also United
States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 90-91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936).
89. 626 F.2d at 1368 (quoting McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics:
Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 161-62 (1970)).
90. 626 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration ofLegitimate Busi-
ness: Civil Remediesfor "CriminalActivity", 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 222 (1975)).
91. 626 F.2d at 1371-72.
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addition, the court found that such an elimination of the "enterprise"
element would pose difficult problems relating to the fifth amendment's
guarantee against double jeopardy. As the court explained, a RICO
defendant may be separately prosecuted for both the RICO offense and
the underlying crimes comprising the "pattern of racketeering" element
of the RICO charge. The court stated that only by requiring proof of
an "enterprise" does RICO require proof of a fact other than the facts
required to prove the predicate crimes.92 The court apparently was
concerned that if this additional fact was not required for a RICO pros-
ecution, a defendant could be tried and convicted twice for what was
effectively the same crime.
Furthermore, the court observed that such a broad construction of
"enterprise" would disrupt the balance between federal and state law
enforcement by permitting greater and more pervasive intrusion by
federal authorities into areas traditionally under state and local author-
ity. In this connection, the court stated that "[t]here is no indication
that Congress ever intended to grant federal prosecutors the flexibility
to pursue relatively minor offenders, having no connection with orga-
nized crime, who simply associate to commit two of the predicate
crimes. '9
3
The court concluded that the term "enterprise" must signify an
association that is substantially different from the acts which form the
"pattern of racketeering activity. ' 94 Consequently, the court held that
the phrase "group of individuals associated in fact" in the definition of
"enterprise" could encompass "only an association having an ascer-
tainable structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining opera-
tions directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can
be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting
the 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ,,95 The court noted the similarity
of its holding to that of its "sole declared ally," the Sixth Circuit panel
in United States v. Sutton; however, the court pointed out that, unlike
the Sutton panel, its holding rested not on the "legitimate" nature of
the "enterprise" but upon the need for a discrete economic association
existing separately from the racketeering activity.96
92. Id. at 1367.
93. Id. at 1372.
94. Id. at 1365.
95. Id. at 1372.
96. Id.
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UNITED STATES V. TURKETTE
Facts of the Case
Between March, 1977, and April, 1978, Novia Turkette and sev-
eral accomplices burglarized eighteen pharmacies in the Boston area. 97
One of Turkette's cohorts was the owner of a burglar alarm company.
He assisted the gang by disconnecting some of the alarms maintained
by his company and by ignoring others when they rang in his office
after Turkette had broken into a store. Drugs taken in the burglaries
were sold to pushers who distributed them on the streets.
In June, 1977, Turkette introduced Kenneth Landers, a member of
the burglary ring, to John Vargas. Vargas and another man owned two
new but unsold modular homes. Turkette told Landers that Vargas
was interested in having some property burned, and Landers subse-
quently set fire to one of the homes at Vargas' instruction. Vargas paid
Landers $1,000 for committing the arson. Landers split this money
with Turkette, and Vargas collected $22,000 in insurance proceeds.
Several months later Turkette engineered a second arson-for-profit
deal involving Landers and Vargas. Once again, Vargas paid Landers
$1,000 to burn down a house. Landers then kicked back $300 to
Turkette. During the same period, Turkette was involved in two insur-
ance fraud schemes. In both instances he arranged to have automobiles
insured and then burned. Insurance claims were filed through the
United States mails, and Turkette obtained the proceeds.
Turkette and various co-defendants were subsquently named in a
nine-count indictment charging violations of several federal criminal
statutes. In count nine of the indictment, Turkette, Vargas, and eleven
others were charged under the conspiracy provision of RICO98 with
conspiring to violate RICO's prohibition against conducting or partici-
pating in the affairs of any interstate "enterprise" through a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 99 The "enterprise" alleged in the indictment
consisted of the association of Turkette and the others for purposes of
97. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 908 (1st Cir. 1980). The court referred to the
crimes committed by Turkette and his cohorts at the pharmacies as robberies; however, from the
description the court gave of those crimes, it is clear that they were actually burglaries. For exam-
ple, the court stated that after Turkette disconnected the burglar alarm system at a targeted store,
the others would force an entry into the building while Turkette kept watch outside. Id. Several
sentences later, the court described a procedure that permitted Turkette and the others to "break
into the stores without fear of discovery." Id. at 909. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266,
§ 16 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (breaking and entering) with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 19
(West 1970) (robbery).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976). See note 10 supra for text of the section.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See note 9 supra for text of the section.
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committing arson and insurance fraud, illegal trafficking in drugs, in-
fluencing the outcome of state trials and bribing police officers.
Turkette was convicted by a jury on all nine counts. In addition to
consecutive prison terms totaling-twenty years on counts one through
eight, he was sentenced to a concurrent twenty-year term and fined
$20,000 on the RICO conspiracy count.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit, Turkette and Vargas challenged the validity of the legal theory
upon which the Government had predicated the RICO count of the
indictment. The Government contended that RICO's definition of "en-
terprise" was so broad that it included any individual or group of indi-
viduals who engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." Thus,
according to the Government's theory, merely by committing crimes
which constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity," Turkette and
Vargas automatically became a RICO "enterprise." The very conduct
which transformed them into an "enterprise" then served as the "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" through which they conducted the affairs
of that "enterprise" in violation of RICO. Turkette and Vargas main-
tained that RICO was intended to protect legitimate businesses from
being preyed upon and taken over by racketeers and was, therefore,
inapplicable to individuals whose only enterprise activity was com-
pletely criminal. It was their position that only legitimate "enterprises"
were within the scope of RICO.
The scope of RICO's "enterprise" element was a question of first
impression for the First Circuit. 00 The court noted that it would be
easy to dismiss out-of-hand an argument that exempted criminal activ-
ity from prosecution. However, the court declined to do this and stated
that an examination of the statute and its legislative history was neces-
sary. 1o
The Turkette Opinion
In United States v. Turkette, the First Circuit reversed the RICO
convictions, holding that RICO could not be applied to illegitimate
"enterprises."'' 0 2 The court began its analysis of the scope of RICO's
"enterprise" element by considering the interrelationship of RICO's
substantive provisions. The first of those provisions, section 1962(a),
prohibits any person from using racketeering income to acquire any
100. 632 F.2d at 897.
101. Id. at 898.
102. Id. at 906.
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interest in any interstate "enterprise" and imposes a strict limitation on
the use of such income to purchase securities on the open market.
0 3
The next substantive provision, section 1962(b), makes it unlawful for
any person to acquire any interest in any interstate "enterprise"
through a "pattern of racketeering activity.' °4 Without explanation,
the court concluded that these two subsections of RICO make sense
only if the "enterprise" is a legitimate one. On the basis of this conclu-
sion, the court reasoned that the RICO provision involved in the
Turkette case, section 1962(c), which prohibits participation in the af-
fairs of any interstate "enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering
activity," could not be interpreted to include illegitimate enterprises
without putting it at odds with sections 1962(a) and (b).'05
Turning to the definition of "enterprise" contained in section
1961(4) of RICO, the court noted that each type of enterprise specifi-
cally enumerated in the section was a legitimate one. According to the
court, it therefore followed, under the principle of statutory construc-
tion known as eusdem generis,10 6 that the definition's general "catch-
all" phrase "any . . . group of individuals associated in fact . . ."
should also be limited to legitimate enterprises. The court declared
that "[ilf Congress had intended to include 'criminal enterprises' in
[RICO's] definition section, it would have done so.'
07
The court stated that section 1962(c) became internally redundant
and important phrases were rendered superfluous if the construction
urged by the Government was accepted. Under the Government's
view, where a "pattern of racketeering activity" could itself be an "en-
terprise," the court found that the phrases "employed by or associated
with any enterprise" and "the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through [a pattern of racketeering activity]" added nothing to the
meaning of section 1962(c). According to the court, the words of the
statute were coherent and logical only if they were read as applying to
legitimate enterprises. 0 8 This view was confirmed, the court stated, by
the fact that RICO not only established substantive crimes, but also
provided civil remedies designed to rehabilitate victimized enterprises
and protect them from further depredations.
The Turkette court found additional support in RICO's legislative
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). See note 7 supra for text of the section.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976). See note 8 supra for text of the section.
105. See notes 7-9 supra.
106. See note 88 supra.
107. 632 F.2d at 899.
108. Id.
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history for its interpretation of "enterprise" as meaning only a legiti-
mate enterprise. That history revealed to the court that more than a
decade ago Congress had been deeply concerned with the grave threat
posed to society by organized crime and had been told by one of its
members that financial and physical incursions by racketeers into legit-
imate businesses and unions had become "one of the Nation's most
serious criminal justice and economic problems." 0 9 Examining the
record of the hearings held by the House and Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees prior to RICO's enactment, as well as the House and Senate
reports on the bill, the House floor debates, and a Justice Department
summary of RICO, the court concluded:
What emerges from RICO's legislative history is that Congress be-
lieved it was enacting a new federal crime, that of interference with
legitimate enterprises by racketeers and racketeering methods. There
is nothing suggesting that it was also legislating against criminal en-
terprises. The House floor debates on the Organized Crime Control
Act is [sic] devoid of anything indicating that any member of Con-
gress thought RICO would reach anything but legitimate busi-
nesses. I 10
The Turkette court found that this focus on legitimate enterprises
had been emphasized when the House of Representatives had rejected
a proposed amendment which would have added a substantive provi-
sion to RICO prohibiting membership in a Mafia or La Cosa Nostra
organization.'' The court noted that similar legislation had been re-
jected several years earlier after the Attorney General had advised
against enactment, stating that he hoped the same objective could be
achieved through continued use of existing conspiracy and racketeering
statutes. 112
109. Id. at 899-900 (quoting Organized Crime Control" Hearings on S. 30 and Related Propos-
als Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1970)
(statement of Senator John L. McClellan)).
110. 632 F.2d at 901 (footnote omitted).
11. This amendment, proposed by Representative Biaggi, defined the groups as "nationally
organized criminal groups composed of persons of Italian ancestry forming an underworld gov-
ernment ruled by a form of board of directors, who direct or conduct a pattern of racketeering
activity and control the national operation of a monopolistic trade restraining criminal conspir-
acy." 116 CONG. REC. 35343 (1970).
112. 632 F.2d at 902. The court quoted the remarks of Attorney General Nicholas Katzen-
bach at 116 CONG. REC. 35344 (1970). In fact, these remarks were made by Mr. Katzenbach
several years earlier before a Senate subcommittee. The remarks which appear at 116 CONG. REC.
35344 are actually those of Representative Poff who was quoting Mr. Katzenbach's earlier state-
ment.
Although it did not expressly say so, the court apparently viewed the rejection of these
amendments as an indication that Congress had been unwilling to extend RICO's coverage to
racketeers whose only business was criminal activity unconnected to the infiltration of legitimate
enterprises. In fact, however, the amendments were not rejected because they prohibited criminal
conduct unrelated to the infiltration of legitimate businesses. The amendments were rejected be-
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The First Circuit stated that a comparison of RICO's legislative
history with that of the federal statute outlawing illegal gambling busi-
nesses"13 showed that Congress knew how to draft legislation which
would make the operation of an illegitimate enterprise a federal of-
fense. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the gambling statute's
definition of an illegal gambling business was very specific.' 4 If a
"pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by RICO could also be a
RICO "enterprise," then RICO could be used to prosecute the commis-
sion of two acts of illegal gambling within a ten-year period as the op-
eration of an illegitimate gambling enterprise, thus completely
circumventing the gambling statute's tightly drawn limitations. Simi-
larly, it was the court's view that an interpretation of RICO which per-
mitted a "pattern of racketeering activity" to be an "enterprise," would
serve to swallow the carefully defined "continuing criminal enterprise"
section of the Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act.' 
5
In the Turkette court's view, this background cast grave doubts on
the Government's simplistic and literal interpretation of the meaning of
"enterprise" as used in RICO. Under the Government's interpretation,
the court said, the concept of "enterprise" was entirely eliminated from
cause of the constitutional difficulties inherent in any attempt to make a crime of mere member-
ship in an organization. Representative Poff made it clear that the focus was on potential
constitutional problems when he questioned Representative Biaggi's amendment in light of cases
such as Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), and Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939), in which the Supreme Court had indicated that status alone, without more, may not be the
basis for a criminal conviction. 116 CONG. REC. 35344 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Pofi). See also
Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime.- Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal
Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 41, 48 (1970).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b) establishes the criteria which must be met before a gambling business
will be within the ambit of the statute. The statute applies only to a gambling business which:
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own
all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of
thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
115. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976). That statute defines a "continuing criminal enterprise" as fol-
lows:
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the pun-
ishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or sub-
chapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons
with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory
position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1976).
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the statute. 116 This approach would allow one individual who commit-
ted two of the crimes enumerated in section 1961 (1) within ten years to
be prosecuted for a RICO violation as well as for the substantive
crimes themselves. Merely by committing two of the section 1961(1)
predicate crimes within ten years, the individual not only committed a
"pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by section 1961(5), but at
the same time, without proof of a single additional fact, became an
"enterprise" himself and was automatically in violation of RICO by
conducting the affairs of that "enterprise" through a "pattern of racke-
teering activity." Giving what it admitted to be an extreme example,
the court stated that such an interpretation of "enterprise" would per-
mit a RICO prosecution against a prostitute for two acts of solicitation
within a ten-year period if she traveled interstate in plying her trade."
7
The court was also troubled by the fact that the Government's in-
terpretation of "enterprise" would extend federal jurisdiction to almost
every criminal activity affecting interstate commerce. The court ex-
pressed concern that such a reading of RICO would give the federal
government a powerful tool for usurping a significant province of state
criminal jurisdiction. While such a use of RICO might be an effective
means of fighting organized crime, the court said it should not be un-
dertaken without some indication that Congress recognized such a po-
tential use when it passed the Act. The court declared that the
legislative history was devoid of any indication that Congress had real-
ized that RICO might result in such a deep incursion into the field of
state and local law enforcement."18
The First Circuit acknowledged that its position was contrary to
that of the majority of circuits which had considered the scope of
RICO's "enterprise" element. However, it found the roots of the other
circuits' case law on the issue to be "shallow and infirm."' 19 The court
observed that the prevailing case law began with the premise that a
combination of criminals associated to commit acts of racketeering
constituted an enterprise within the ambit of section 1961(4) which de-
fined "enterprise" as including "any .. . [association] in fact." Ac-
cording to the court, the other circuits viewed this use of the word
116. 632 F.2d at 903.
117. Id. at 904.
118. Id. The court's concern with this potential disruption of the federal-state balance was
grounded on its perception that the Government's interpretation of RICO rendered the statute
essentially equivalent to a traditional state conspiracy statute. However, the court devoted only a
single paragraph of its opinion to a discussion of this issue and apparently did not view it as a
major problem. See note 146 infra.
119. Id. at 905.
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"any" in the statute along with the statute's failure to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate enterprises as evidence that even ille-
gitimate associations were within the scope of the term "enterprise" as
it was used in RICO. However, the First Circuit declared, such a drag-
net use of the word "any" obscured the critical issue: the proper scope
of "enterprise" in the context of the statute as a whole and its legislative
history.
According to the court, most of the cases which had construed "en-
terprise" to include illegitimate associations had sought to support their
interpretation by pointing to a clause in RICO which stated that the
Act's provisions should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.1 20 Reliance on this clause for such a purpose was misplaced,
the court said. Citing the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's report
on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, the court stated that the
liberal construction clause pertained only to RICO's civil remedies.' 2'
To hold otherwise would violate the principle that "ambiguity concern-
ing the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of len-
ity."1
22
The Turkelle court expressed the opinion that the other courts'
120. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)
states:
The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.
121. 632 F.2d at 905 (citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969)). In fact, however,
the language of the liberal construction clause clearly indicates that it is to be applied to "[tihe
provisions of this title [RICO]." There is no indication that the clause is limited in its application
to only the civil remedies. See note 120 supra for the complete text of the liberal construction
clause. Moreover, the Senate report nowhere states that the liberal construction clause pertains
only to RICO's civil remedies. What that report does state with regard to the civil remedies is this:
"Title IX thus brings to bear on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business or
other organizations the full panoply of civil remedies . . . now available in the antitrust area."
Senate report, supra, at 81.
122. 632 F.2d at 905 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). A plausible
argument can be made that use of the liberal construction clause to expand the scope of the
statutory definition of "enterprise" violates the principle that ambiguities in criminal statutes are
to be strictly construed. This argument first requires a finding that the statutory definition is
ambiguous regarding the inclusion of associations formed for illegitimate purposes. Once such
ambiguity is found, the argument is that the principle of lenity bars any resolution of the ambigu-
ity which would increase liability under the statute. Thus, since inclusion of illegitimate associa-
tions in the list of entities which may be RICO "enterprises" could, arguably, increase the range of
potential RICO defendants, such illegitimate associations should not be included within the defi-
nition of "enterprise." A district court in Georgia gave an interesting, and not wholly unconvinc-
ing, response to a very similar argument: Membership alone in a RICO "enterprise," whatever
the nature of that "enterprise," is not a proscribed activity. Thus, the due process principles upon
which the strict construction rule regarding criminal statutes is grounded are not offended if the
meaning of the term "enterprise" is not strictly construed. While it is proper to construe strictly
statutes which proscribe criminal activity, it is a different thing entirely to apply the strict construc-
tion canon of statutory construction to a definitional concept the limits of which do not determine
criminal liability. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138-39, 138 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
Responding to the use of cases such as Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) and United
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natural antipathy to organized crime had clouded their perception of
RICO, its purpose, and its legislative history. According to the First
Circuit, the other courts had apparently overlooked the fact that par-
ticipants in illegitimate enterprises could be prosecuted under existing
federal and state statutes, thus making it unnecessary to undertake
what the First Circuit saw as a distortion of RICO. In the First Cir-
cuit's opinion, "RICO was not enacted as an offensive weapon against
criminals, but as a shield to thwart their depredations against legitimate
business enterprises."'
123
ANALYSIS OF THE TURKETTE OPINION
There are three central themes in the decision of the Turkette court
that RICO encompasses only legitimate enterprises: statutory construc-
tion, legislative history, and elimination of the statute's "enterprise" el-
ement.
Statutory Construction
The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute
is the language of the statute itself. 124 Quite properly, this is where the
First Circuit began its analysis in Turkette. Examining the statutory
language of sections 1962(a) and (b), 125 the court concluded, without
explanation, that these sections made sense only if the "enterprise" in-
volved was a legitimate one.' 26 It followed, therefore, that section
1962(c) 127 must also be limited to legitimate enterprises.
Apparently, in the case of section 1962(a), the court was led to
conclude that the section made sense only in the context of legitimate
enterprises by the fact that the section provides for an exception from
liability where illegitimate funds are used to make certain limited
purchases of securities on the open market. As far as it goes, this con-
clusion by the court is correct. The exception contained in section
1962(a) does indeed make sense only if the "enterprise" is legitimate.
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) in support of the proposition that the canon of strict construc-
tion was applicable to the definition of "enterprise," the Thevis court stated:
[Tihis court believes each of those holdings inapposite, for in each the Supreme Court
was construing a statute which proscribed certain conduct. The definitional statute
under scrutiny here, on the other hand, does not outlaw any sort of behavior, and thus,
the aforementioned citations are not on point.
474 F. Supp. at 138 n.4.
123. 632 F.2d at 906.
124. Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978).
125. See notes 7 & 8 supra for text of the sections.
126. 632 F.2d at 899.
127. See note 9 supra for text of the section.
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Obviously, illegitimate "enterprises" do not issue securities, much less
issue them on the open market. However, it does not follow that the
language of the major portion of section 1962(a) must also pertain only
to legitimate enterprises. That language speaks in terms of prohibiting
the investment of racketeering income in any "enterprise." It is entirely
plausible that the limited open market investment exception applies
only to certain classes of legitimate enterprises while the central prohi-
bition of the section applies to investment of illegal funds in either le-
gitimate or illegitimate enterprises.
The fact that the language of the section speaks of "investment" in
an "enterprise" certainly does not lead to the conclusion that the "en-
terprise" must be legitimate. Investment means "an expenditure of
money for income or profit."' 28 Given this definition, it seems clear
that the language of the section 1962(a) prohibition would apply with
equal* force whether a mobster used illegally obtained funds to
purchase an interest in a bank or to finance a loansharking operation.
In both cases he would have invested racketeering income in an "enter-
prise." This is what section 1962(a) prohibits. The Turkette court's
conclusion that the section makes sense only if applied to a legitimate
"enterprise" does not bear up under close scrutiny.
Similarly, the court's unexplained conclusion that section 1962(b)
is sensible only in the case of legitimate enterprises does not find sup-
port in the plain meaning of that section's language. Section 1962(b)
prohibits the use of a "pattern of racketeering activity" to "acquire or
maintain" an interest in any "enterprise." Thus, for example, the stat-
ute would clearly prohibit the use of a pattern of murders and extortion
to acquire ownership of an auto parts store. There is not a single word
in section 1962(b) which suggests that the section would be inapplicable
or would make no sense if the same pattern of criminal acts was used to
take over the ownership of an illegal automobile "chop-shop" opera-
tion.
Since there is no sound basis in the language of sections 1962(a)
and (b) for finding that these sections can apply only to legitimate en-
terprises, there is no reason to believe that section 1962(c) must be so
limited. Section 1962(c) prohibits one who is "employed by or associ-
ated with" an "enterprise" from conducting or participating in the af-
fairs of that "enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering activity."
Thus, for example, the operator of an importing firm who facilitated
his business by a series of bribes to customs officials could be found
128. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1964).
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guilty of violating section 1962(c). There is nothing in the language of
section 1962(c) to suggest that the section could not also be used to
prosecute a heroin distributor who protected his sources of supply
through a similar pattern of illegal bribery.
The First Circuit's conclusion that the language of sections 1962(a)
through (c) mandates a finding that a RICO "enterprise" must be legit-
imate is unsound. If such a limitation is to be found at all in the statu-
tory language, it must be found in the statutory definition of the term
"enterprise." That definition draws no distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate "enterprises"; instead, it provides a representative list
of entities which are "includ[ed]" in the term "enterprise."'' 29
The cardinal rule in interpreting a statute is that there is no need to
turn to the legislative history or to rules of statutory construction if the
meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. 130 The
language used in the definition of "enterprise" is simple and straight-
forward. There is certainly no patent ambiguity in the meaning of that
definition. Nevertheless, the Turkette court applied the doctrine of ejus-
dem generis '3 ' to RICO's definition of "enterprise" and concluded that
the general phrase "any. . . group. . . associated in fact although not
a legal entity" must mean only legitimate associations since that phrase
is preceded in the statute by several specific examples of legitimate enti-
ties.
Given the clarity with which the definition of "enterprise" was
drafted as well as the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Organized
Crime Control Act of which RICO is a part is "a carefully crafted piece
of legislation,"'' 32 it does not seem that this is an appropriate instance
for the application of eusdem generis. However, even if it is conceded
for the sake of argument that eusdem generis may be applied in this
situation, that application does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
reached in Turkette. Ejusdem generis provides that general terms
which follow a list of specific items in a statute must be read to encom-
pass only items belonging to the same general class as the listed specific
items. In the "enterprise" definition, the specific items listed are: "in-
dividual, partnership, corporation. . . ." The general phrase which
follows is: "any. . . group. . . associated in fact although not a legal
entity." Turkette assumed that the general class to which the specific
items belonged was: types of legal entities. Thus, it followed that the
129. See note 13 supra for the text of the statutory definition of "enterprise."
130. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1003, 1006 (6th Cir. 1980).
131. See note 88 supra for a definition of ejusdem generis.
132. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
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subsequent general phrase could include only legitimate associations. It
is just as plausible, however, to interpret the general class to which the
specific items in the definition belong as being: types of entities. This
interpretation does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
general phrase "any. . . group. . . associated in fact" must mean only
legitimate associations. Both legitimate and illegitimate associations
may belong to the general class: types of entities.
In any event, ejusdem generis is not a rule of law. It is merely a
tool that can be used when the intent of the legislature is not otherwise
apparent. 133 In the case of RICO, however, there is convincing evi-
dence of a legislative intent to make the definition of "enterprise" ex-
pansive. As pointed out by Professor Robert Blakey of Notre Dame,
former chief counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedures during the time that RICO was drafted, Congress very
carefully selected the word "includes" for use in the definition of "en-
terprise."' 134 "Includes," the professor notes, is a term of enlargement,
not of limitation.135 Thus, the definition of "enterprise" in the statute,
like that of the term "person," operates by way of illustration, not by
way of limitation. That Congress knew what it was doing in this regard
is amply demonstrated by its choice of words in the more restrictive
definition of "racketeering activity." There, Congress carefully used a
limiting term: racketeering activity "means . . 136
Legislative History
RICO's legislative history undeniably shows that Congress was
deeply concerned with the infiltration of legitimate businesses by racke-
teers when it enacted the statute. But there can be no doubt that Con-
gress never expressly disclaimed interest in applying RICO to wholly
illegitimate enterprises. The argument that the legislative history
shows a single-minded resolve by Congress that RICO should apply
only to legitimate enterprises depends for its success on the existence of
a negative: Congress did not expressly proclaim the statute's applica-
bility to illegitimate "enterprises"; therefore, despite the clear meaning
133. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978).
134. Blakey & Gettings, RICO Evening Up the Odds, 16 TRIAL No. 10 58, 59 (1980) [herein-
after referred to as Blakey]. See note 13 supra for the definition of "enterprise" (" 'enterprise'
includes . . .").
135. Blakey, supra note 134, at 59 nn.16 & 22 (citing Highway & City Freight Drivers v.
Gordon Transps., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978)).
136. See note 11 supra for the statutory definition of "racketeering activity."
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of the statutory definition of "enterprise," the statute cannot apply to
illegitimate "enterprises."
This focus on the congressional purpose in enacting RICO tends to
become parochial. The fundamental purpose of the Organized Crime
Control Act, to eradicate organized crime in the United States, is ig-
nored while Congress' concern with the infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses is thrust to the forefront as evidence of a purported
"congressional intent" to limit the scope of RICO. The legislative his-
tory contains a wealth of evidence indicating that Congress was fully
aware of the broad scope of the problem which it faced and of the need
to launch a broad-based attack on that problem. For example, in addi-
tion to the remarks previously mentioned, 37 Senator McClellan made
the following introductory comments before a House subcommittee
conducting hearings on his bill which ultimately became the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970:
What I say to you today is that the crime situation in America is so
critical and particularly so, I believe, with respect to organized crime,
because organized crime supports and promotes unorganized crime:
the victims of organized crime, for example, commit crimes in order
to support their drug appetites and so forth.
This situation is so critical in my judgment that today it is incum-
bent upon the Congress of the United States to provide every legal tool
within the framework of the Constitution that can be made available to
our law enforcement officials to combat organized crime.
• . . The social poison for which S. 30 is intended to be an effec-
tive antidote has already crippled or weakened vital organs and cen-
ters of our body politic, and it is still spreading and spreading
rapidly. Unless we act effectively, and with dispatch, organized
crime may well destroy the social, political, economic, and moral
heart of our Nation.
Never in the history of America has organized crime had greater
adverse impact and widespread control over the social, political, and
economic lives of our citizens and institutions than it does today.
Never has the national criminal syndicate known as La Cosa Nostra
managed with greater success than now to maintain profitable opera-
tions in so many areas and in such a variety of illegal interprises
[sicI ..
One of those enterprises, of course, as we all know, is trade in nar-
cotics. . . . We must not permit illicit operations such as this, sap-
ping our vital strength as a society, to continue to plague and
endanger this Nation.
138
Similarly, in speaking of the inadequacies of existing laws for
137. See notes 36-44 supra and accompanying text.
138. House Hearings, supra note 38, at 86-87 (emphasis added).
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dealing with racketeers, the Senate Report on the Organized Crime
Control Act stated: "Obviously, the time has come for afrontal attack
on the subversion of our economic system by organized criminal activi-
ties. . . . In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic
power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts."'
139
Considering these comments, it does not make a great deal of
sense to assume that Congress was as concerned with limiting the scope
of RICO as it was with eliminating organized crime. Certainly, Con-
gress was greatly concerned with blocking organized crime's infiltration
of legitimate businesses when it enacted RICO, and it spoke of RICO
primarily in terms of that objective. But there is no indication that
Congress intended that RICO should have that objective as its sole
purpose. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, at least two congressmen ar-
ticulated views indicating that RICO could be employed directly
against racketeering activity.
40
A proper analysis of RICO's legislative history demands that more
emphasis be placed upon the nature of the forces which led Congress to
enact the Organized Crime Control Act and upon the central policy
underlying the Act. Viewed in this light, the use of RICO to attack
illegitimate "enterprises" which are operated through ancillary patterns
of racketeering seems fully justified. It is undeniable that a major
source of organized crime's power is the synergistic effect that occurs
when one pattern of criminal activity, such as bribery and official cor-
ruption, is used to perpetuate and expand the other operations of an
illegal association such as a Mafia "family."'
141
Moreover, as pointed out in the Senate report, a primary method
used by organized crime to gain control of business concerns is the in-
vestment of "profits acquired from illegal ventures."142 The report also
referred to the ineffectiveness of prosecution against organized crime
figures "as long as the flow of money continues." 143 In this connection,
the report concluded that new approaches were needed to deal with the
"economic base through which [organized criminals] constitute such a
serious threat to the economic well being of the Nation." 144 One such
"new approach" could well be the use of RICO to attack illegitimate
"enterprises" which are operated through a "pattern of racketeering ac-
139. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 78-79 (1969) (emphasis added).
140. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
141. See ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 28, at 153-72 for a thorough discussion of the Mafia's
use of bribery and corruption to maintain its power.
142. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1969).
143. Id. at 78 (quoting the Attorney General's testimony before a Senate subcommittee).
144. Id. at 79.
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tivity." As suggested in United States v. Rone,"4 5 such a use of RICO
fully comports with the congressional desire to protect legitimate busi-
nesses. By using RICO against illegitimate "enterprises," the flow of
revenues generated by those "enterprises" is interdicted at the source.
Deprived of those funds, racketeers are effectively barred from invest-
ing them in legitimate "enterprises."
Elimination of the "Enterprise" Element
A major concern of the Turkette court was that the "enterprise"
element would, in effect, be read out of the statute if the "enterprise"
was defined as an association to commit the same crimes constituting
the "pattern of racketeering activity."'' 46 Although not expressly ad-
dressed in such terms by the Turkette court, the danger seen by other
courts 147 and commentators 48 in permitting such an "elimination" of
the "enterprise" element was a potential violation of the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy clause. 49 Under the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 50 a single act may be
an offense against two statutes only if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not. If proof of the elements of
one crime necessarily proves the elements of another, the two crimes
are regarded as the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes and
145. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). See notes 66-70 supra and
accompanying text.
146. 632 F.2d at 903. A secondary concern of the court in this regard was that such an "elimi-
nation" of the "enterprise" element would tend to disrupt the federal-state balance in law enforce-
ment. 632 F.2d at 904. The court did not question that Congress could constitutionally assert
federal law enforcement jurisdiction over areas traditionally reserved to state authorities. Instead,
the court in Turkette was concerned that Congress had not sufficiently indicated an intention to
take jurisdiction over traditionally local crimes to the extent that would result if the "enterprise"
element were to be "eliminated" as in the government's proposed use of RICO.
Absent the problem with the "enterprise" element, there is little room for doubt that Congress
has the power to take jurisdiction over local crimes that affect interstate commerce. Congress'
power in this area derives from the commerce clause of the Constitution which provides that
Congress shall have the power "[tjo regulate Commerce ...among the several States .... "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. That power has frequently been held to be very broad, requiring only
a de minimus effect on interstate commerce in order to justify federal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). See generally
Comment, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 805. Congress specifically included eight state crimes within RICO's definition of "racketeer-
ing activity." Certainly, there can be no clearer indication than this that Congress intended to
assert federal jurisdiction where these crimes affected an interstate "enterprise."
147. Eg., United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (1980).
148. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 8; Bradley, supra note 32, at 855.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides:
No person shall. . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. ...
150. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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the offender cannot be punished twice for the same offense. Thus, the
argument is that where a conviction and separate sentence are obtained
for both the RICO offense and the "pattern" crimes, the defendant is,
in effect, punished twice for the same offense if the RICO "enterprise"
element is effectively eliminated. Only if that element is proven inde-
pendently of the "pattern" crimes does the RICO offense require proof
of an additional fact and thus escape the "same offense" proscription of
the Blockburger test.
It immediately becomes apparent under this analysis that,
whatever double jeopardy problems may be lurking in the statutory
language, they remain only latent problems until sentences are actually
obtained for both the RICO offense and the "pattern" crimes. Thus,
these potential problems can be avoided by electing to prosecute either
the RICO offense or the "pattern" crimes, but not both. This is hardly
a compelling reason to find that a RICO "enterprise" must be legiti-
mate in order to avoid double jeopardy violations. This analysis also
overlooks the fact that where state "pattern" crimes are involved, sepa-
rate sentences for those crimes and the RICO offense are entirely per-
missible under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine of Abbate v. United
States,'5 l even if the RICO offense is absolutely identical to the state
"pattern" crimes.
Nevertheless, concern with the effective "elimination" of the "en-
terprise" element is justified. Congress clearly intended that there be
independent proof of both an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" in order to obtain a RICO conviction. Where the "pattern
of racketeering activity" automatically constitutes the "enterprise" in a
case, the Government is allowed to obtain a conviction by providing
evidence which proves only that the defendant engaged in a "pattern of
racketeering activity." Thus, in United States v. Aleman,152 the Gov-
ernment offered proof that Aleman and his companions committed
three home invasions. Clearly, this evidence satisfied the "pattern of
racketeering activity" element of RICO. 153 However, in the court's
view, this same evidence, without more, automatically proved that
151. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). The "dual sovereignty" doctrine provides that a federal prosecution
does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of the same person for the same acts, and a state
prosecution does not bar a federal one. Prosecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns such as
the state and federal governments do not subject the defendant to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377
(1922). In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Supreme Court discussed Bartkus
and Abbale at length and clearly reaffirmed the validity of the "dual sovereignty" doctrine.
152. 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
153. See note 12 supra for the definition of "pattern of racketeering activity."
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Aleman and his companions constituted a RICO "enterprise" by virtue
of their having associated with each other to commit the home inva-
sions.' 54 This carries the broad interpretation of RICO's "enterprise"
element too far. It is one thing to permit a RICO "enterprise" to be an
association formed for wholly illegitimate purposes. It is another thing
entirely to effectively dispense with the need to prove the existence of
that "enterprise" independently of the bare association to commit the
"pattern" crimes.
The First Circuit would eliminate this problem by confining the
"enterprise" to legitimate associations, thereby ensuring that it remains
distinct from the "pattern of racketeering activity," which by definition
consists of criminal conduct. Such an approach would prohibit a
RICO prosecution of illegal gamblers for conducting illegal gambling
through a pattern of illegal gambling or of prostitutes for conducting
prostitution through a pattern of prostitution. This is a correct result
where the same acts constitute both the "enterprise" and the "pattern of
racketeering activity." However, it would also prohibit a RICO prose-
cution in the Whitehead situation where the "enterprise" and the "pat-
tern of racketeering activity," while both illegal, are factually and
conceptually distinct and proof of one does not obviate the need to
prove the other.
A Better Approach
A better approach appears to be that taken by the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. Anderson. 155 Under that approach, it does not seem
to be mandatory that the "enterprise" be legitimate, only that it be dis-
tinct from the crimes constituting the "pattern of racketeering activity"
in the case. This view comports with the congressional requirement
that the two elements be proven independently and does no violence to
the statutory definition of "enterprise" which makes no distinction be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate "enterprises." Under this approach, a
RICO prosecution would be permissible in the Whitehead situation
where the operations of an illegal interstate prostitution "enterprise"
were facilitated through a "pattern" of bribery and official corruption.
What this view would preclude is a RICO prosecution in the Aleman
situation where no effective distinction existed between the home inva-
154. See note 17 supra for the indictment inAleman which charged that the same home inva-
sions constituted both the "enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeering activity."
155. See notes 84-96 supra and accompanying text.
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sion "enterprise" and the "pattern" of home invasions through which
the affairs of that "enterprise" were conducted.
It is conceivable that difficulties might arise in affirming Turkette's
conviction under the Anderson approach. For example, if the "enter-
prise" was taken to be the burglary ring and the distinct "pattern"
crimes to be the arson and insurance fraud schemes, there is no solid
indication that Turkette conducted the affairs of that "enterprise"
through those "pattern" crimes. On the other hand, if the illegitimate
"enterprise" could be found to be the drug distribution operation to
which Turkette wholesaled his stolen drugs, there is no difficulty in see-
ing that he participated in the affairs of that "enterprise" through a
distinct "pattern" of burglaries. In any event, there can be little doubt
that demanding independent proof of the two crucial elements of the
offense is preferable to permitting both elements to be satisfied by the
same evidence. Such an approach is also preferable to one which relies
upon what it at best an ambiguous legislative history to impose a "legit-
imacy" requirement upon the unambiguous language in the statutory
definition of the "enterprise" element.
A requirement that a RICO "enterprise" must be "legitimate"
could create as many difficulties as it might solve. The word "legiti-
mate" may be subject to varying interpretations. A question that
would surely arise under such a "legitimacy" requirement would con-
cern the degree of illegitimacy that would be tolerated in a business
before it could no longer serve as a RICO "enterprise." A prostitution
ring clearly could not be a RICO "enterprise" if the "enterprise" were
required to be completely legitimate. However, an otherwise ostensibly
legitimate business might be in violation of so many licensing ordi-
nances, zoning regulations, or health codes so as to be completely "ille-
gitimate" in the eyes of local authorities. Could such a business
nevertheless be considered sufficiently legitimate to be a "legitimate en-
terprise" for purposes of RICO? Such a legitimacy requirement,
whether added by Congress as an amendment to RICO or judicially
engrafted by courts attempting to devine what Congress may have in-
tended, would tempt racketeers to devise schemes whereby they could
avoid prosecution under the statute by ensuring that every "enterprise"
in which they engaged had an element of illegitimacy sufficient to re-
move it from the scope of RICO.
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CONCLUSION
Relying on RICO's legislative history, the First Circuit in Turkette
found that Congress was concerned with the infiltration of legitimate
businesses by racketeers when it passed the Act. Drawing on this back-
ground and considering the interrelationship of RICO's subsections, as
well as the relationship of RICO to the other provisions of the Orga-
nized Crime Control Act of 1970, the court concluded that RICO could
be applied only to legitimate enterprises. The court found this conclu-
sion to be justified by its concerns that a broader construction, encom-
passing illegitimate enterprises, would disturb the federal-state law
enforcement balance and would tend to read the "enterprise" element
out of the statute.
The most serious of those concerns, the elimination of the "enter-
prise" element, could also have been alleviated by an approach similar
to that taken by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Anderson. Under
that approach, the crucial test is not the legitimacy of the "enterprise"
but its existence distinct from the "pattern of racketeering activity."
Since the language of the statute, when read literally and without resort
to unnecessary use of statutory construction, does not demand that the
"enterprise" be legitimate, it seems that the Anderson approach is pref-
erable to that in Turkette. Such an approach would avoid the new set of
problems which would arise as a result of engrafting a legitimacy re-
quirement onto the "enterprise" element.
When the United States Supreme Court considers the Turkette
case, it will be determining the future effectiveness of one of the most
potent weapons in the arsenal against organized criminal groups rang-
ing from the Mafia to sophisticated white collar criminals. It should
not needlessly circumscribe the utility of this powerful statute by im-
posing a requirement that a RICO "enterprise" must be legiti-
mate.*Any excesses which may have occurred in the use of RICO can
be avoided in the future by demanding that the government prove the
''enterprise" element by a set of facts independent of those offered to
prove the "pattern of racketeering activity" element.
JOHN A. HELLER
* As the volume containing this case comment went to press, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in the Turkette case, holding that the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encom-
passes both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. United States v. Turkette, 49 U.S.L.W. 4743
(U.S. June 17, 1981). Flatly rejecting the First Circuit's reasoning, the Court declared:
Contrary to the judgment below, neither the language nor structure of RICO limits
its application to legitimate "enterprises." Applying it also to criminal organizations
does not render any portion of the statute superfluous nor does it create any structural
incongruities within the framework of the Act. The result is neither absurd nor surpris-
ing. On the contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under
RICO is the more incongruous position.
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• . . In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the
statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to
only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltra-
tion of legitimate business.
Id. at 4746-47 (emphasis in original).
The Court carefully pointed out, however, that the "enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" elements must both be proven in order to obtain a conviction under RICO:
In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the exist-
ence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." The enter-
prise is an entity . . . . The pattern or racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series
of criminal acts as defined by the statute. . . . The former is proved by evidence of an
ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates
function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number
of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof
used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one
does not necessarily establish the other. The "enterprise" is not the "pattern of racke-
teering activity"; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which
must be proved by the Government.
Id. at 4745 (footnote omitted).
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